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COMMENT
WILL MONTANA BREATHE LIFE INTO ITS
POSITIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EQUAL
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY?
Hillary A. Wandler'
A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or re-
vised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how
efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they
are unjust.2
INTRODUCTION
Montana's constitution establishes the positive right of
every Montanan to an equal educational opportunity. 3 Unfortu-
1. I would like to thank the following people who provided invaluable editorial assis-
tance: Tom Leonard, Malin Steams, Professor David Aronofsky, Professor Robert G.
Natelson, Assistant Professor Stacey Gordon, Professor Thomas P. Huff, Adjunct Profes-
sor Kristen Juras, and my mother, Deborah Biehl, a teacher in the Montana public
school system since 1972. Any inaccuracies are solely my own.
2. JoHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (Belknap Press rev. ed. 1999). John Rawls
was concerned with the basic structure of political and social institutions that "define
men's rights and duties and influence their life prospects." Id. at 6. Rawls called for the
reformation or abolishment of institutions that were found unjust. Id. at 3.
3. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1. The provision reads:
Educational goals and duties:
(1) It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which will de-
velop the full educational potential of each person. Equality of educational op-
portunity is guaranteed to each person of the state.
1
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nately, Montana's courts and legislature have been unable to
clearly define the equal opportunity mandated by the constitu-
tion. Perhaps the primary reason for this is a failure to recog-
nize the Montana Constitution imposes two interrelated, yet dis-
tinct duties upon the state: (1) an obligation to maintain a
certain standard of educational quality across the state; and (2)
an obligation to offer an equal opportunity to receive an educa-
tion at that standard.
In Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State,4 the
Montana Supreme Court found a connection between the
amount of money provided public schools and the quality of edu-
cational opportunity afforded public school students. 5 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that different funding levels between
school districts had resulted in different educational opportuni-
ties.6 One logical interpretation of the Helena Elementary deci-
sion is that equal dollars per student should result in equal edu-
cational opportunity. The legislative response to Helena
Elementary indicates that is exactly the interpretation the Mon-
tana legislature has adopted.
In contrast to the equality standard, which the court has
addressed, there is no clear line in Montana judicial precedent
regarding the constitutional reference to quality public schools.
The court has not interpreted the state's obligation with respect
to quality. As a result, the legislature has shown confusion
about the role of quality in school funding and its interaction
with the clearly established standard of equal educational op-
portunity under the Montana Constitution. Montana's current
public school funding scheme shows the legislature has seized
the only standard Montana courts have defined-the equality
standard-and interpreted that to mean equal or near-equal dol-
(2) The state recognizes the distinct and unique cultural heritage of the
American Indians and is committed in its educational goals to the preservation
of their cultural integrity.
(3) The legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public elemen-
tary and secondary schools. The legislature may provide such other educa-
tional institutions, public libraries, and educational programs as it deems de-
sirable. It shall fund and distribute in an equitable manner to the school
districts the state's share of the cost of the basic elementary and secondary
school system.
4. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 55, 769 P.2d 684, 690
(1989), amended by 236 Mont. 61, 769 P.2d 684 (1990).
5. Id. ("We conclude that as a result of the failure to adequately fund the Foundation
Program, forcing an excessive reliance on permissive and voted levies, the State has
failed to provide a system of quality public education granting to each student the equal-
ity of educational opportunity guaranteed under Art. X, Sec. 1, Mont. Const.").
6. Id.
344 Vol. 65
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lars per student will meet its constitutional obligation.7
Montana needs clarification of the relationship between
equality and quality under its constitutional education provi-
sions. The court should make clear that the Montana Constitu-
tion requires equality of quality educational opportunity, not
just equality of dollars per student. In other words, equal qual-
ity does not result from simple fiscal equality. Part I of this ar-
ticle discusses the theory of equal educational opportunity. Part
II traces the historical foundations of Montana school funding.
Part III discusses the Montana constitutional guarantee of equal
educational opportunity and educational quality, and Montana
judicial and legislative interpretations of those constitutional
provisions. Part IV looks outward for lessons from other state
courts. Part V discusses current issues of inequality and inade-
quacy in Montana's school funding scheme. Once Montana's
courts clarify the state's constitutional obligation with respect to
both quality and equality, the legislature will have a framework
within which to review per-student funding and set Montana's
funding system on a logically sound foundation consistent with
underlying constitutional policies and objectives.
I. THEORY OF EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY
Article X of the Montana Constitution is based on the theory
of equal educational opportunity. However, competing under-
standings of this theory may cause confusion about the article
itself. Does article X guarantee a just system in the sense that
equalization will compensate the system's less advantaged
members,8 or does the provision contemplate an equal minimum
7. Bruce Sievers noted in his essay on equal educational opportunity written for the
Montana Constitutional Convention: "The simplest 'equal' distribution plan, of course, is
a uniform per student or per capita allotment for an entire state. However, this ignores
the expenditure-quality relationship, varying educational needs and questions of effort."
BRUCE SIEVERS, STUDY No. 17, at 60 (Mont. Const'l Convention Comm'n 1971-72).
8. John Rawls, in his book A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, writes of a social
contract under which individuals would agree to two basic principles of justice: (1) the
principle of "greatest equal liberty;" and (2) the requirement that any inequalities, social
or economic, "are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in
particular for the least advantaged members of society." Id. at 13, 107. The second prin-
ciple embodies the theory of equal opportunity. The Education and Public Lands Com-
mittee of the Montana Constitutional Convention acknowledged that Montana's educa-
tion system must be based on fundamental principles of justice: "Clearly the [Montana]
educational system must be directed to the elimination of blatant injustices which may
predetemine [sic] a life-long disadvantage." II MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
723 (Mont. Const'l Convention Comm'n 1971-72) rhereinafter CONVENTION].
2004 345
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baseline with the option for some communities to provide more
for their children?9
One understanding of equal educational opportunity is that
it requires a system to focus attention on its least advantaged
members and bring them onto an even playing field with oth-
ers. 10 It is common sense that some people will be born with a
material advantage over others due to "social fortune or their
luck in the natural lottery."" A system based on equal educa-
tional opportunity would take those natural differences and shift
them to compensate the disadvantaged. 12 Applying this under-
standing of equal opportunity to school funding, a funding
scheme would only be justified if it improved the situation of
educationally disadvantaged children. The state would have to
focus its attention and funding on those children arbitrarily
placed in poor school districts. 13
Another understanding of equal educational opportunity is
that it requires the educational institution to provide an equal
minimum level of opportunity, accompanied by local freedom to
9. Professor Edward Foley takes a different view of equality of opportunity than
Rawls. See Edward Foley, Rodriguez Revisited: Constitutional Theory and School Fi-
nance, 32 GA. L. REV. 475 (1998). Foley adopts Rawls' method of determining fundamen-
tal principles of justice-the "original position"-but within the context of educational
opportunity, he disagrees with the principles of equality and redistribution to which
Rawls adheres. Id. at 490. In contrast to the Rawlsian notion of equality of opportunity,
Foley argues that from an objective unbiased position, an individual would choose "a
guarantee of an adequate education, coupled with the parental freedom to spend more"
on his or her own child. Id. at 492.
10. Anna Lukemeyer calls this the "equality" standard. ANNA LUKEMEYER, COURTS
AS POLICYMAKERS: SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM LITIGATION 18 (LFB Scholarly Publishing
LLC 2003). She asserts that a strict equality standard "implies no absolute minimum,
and is satisfied so long as all districts spend equally (or provide equal resources), regard-
less of level." Id. John Rawls would not likely endorse this concept of strict equality. He
reasons that the expectations of those who are in a better social position are just only if
they result in improving the expectations of those who are in the least favored position in
society. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 87. In the context of educational resources, according to
Rawls, the difference principle would focus on a distribution of resources that would "im-
prove the long-term expectation of the least favored." Id.
11. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 65. Rawls calls this the "difference principle."
12. Id. Rawls refuses to accept natural positions of advantage or disadvantage as in-
evitably creating an unjust system.
13. Although Rawls' theory is one envisioning ultimate mutual benefit or "harmony of
interests" of the least and most advantaged, it would not necessarily require that the
more advantaged initially benefit from the system. Id. at 90. Instead, Rawls suggests
that those who are more advantaged have in essence been "compensated" in relation to
those who are in a poorer position. Id. at 88. He would argue that focusing remedial at-
tention on the least advantaged is the only just approach. Id.
4
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provide more. 14 Students are given equal opportunity up to a
defined point, after which equality no longer operates. This un-
derstanding would endorse a funding scheme so long as it pro-
vided an equal minimum baseline. There would be no limit on
the amount of resources each community could provide above
the minimum baseline-equality would matter only up to the
minimum funding amount, however high or low that may be. 15
In deciding which understanding of equal educational op-
portunity is best for Montana's children, we should analyze the
education system from an objective position. 16 We should search
for what we believe is a just system by identifying those princi-
ples we would agree to be bound by if we could end up any per-
son in Montana-adult, child, rich, or poor. If from this reflec-
tion, we choose principles different from those under which we
now operate, the injustice of our current practice will be clear.
Our discussion about educational equality and quality would no
longer be muted by our natural biases; it would be crystallized. 17
The inquiry would become: Would I agree to the public school
funding scheme if I were a child in any school in Montana?
One reason we might choose a minimum adequacy standard
over a strict equality standard is that strict equality may result
in "equalizing down." That is, if forced to focus funding on the
14. Foley, supra note 9, at 492. Anna Lukemeyer calls this the "minimum adequacy"
standard. LUKEMEYER, supra note 10, at 17.
15. See LUKEMEYER, supra note 10, at 17-18 (noting that under a "minimum ade-
quacy" standard, "[1]ocal districts are free to provide any amount of educational services
beyond the amount defined as 'adequate,' but every district must provide its students
some defined level of spending, educational resources, or skills.").
16. This idea comes from John Rawls' "original position," where individuals agreeing
to a social contract choose principles from a position that ensures the outcome is a fair
agreement or bargain. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 15. In the hypothetical original position,
principles are chosen from behind a "veil of ignorance." Id. at 118-23. In other words, an
individual doesn't know any facts about his social or economic position in life, what natu-
ral abilities he has, or his conception of what is right or good. "No one knows his situa-
tion in society nor his natural assets, and therefore no one is in a position to tailor prin-
ciples to his advantage." Id. at 120-21. All individuals are classless behind the veil.
17. Jonathan Kozol, noted for his works illustrating educational inequalities across
the nation, observes:
'Despite a lot of pious rhetoric about equality of opportunity ... most parents
want their children to have a more than equal chance of success'-which
means, inevitably, that they want others, not all others but some others, to
have less than equal chances.' . . . There is good reason, then ... that 'discus-
sion about educational inequalities is muted.' . . . The vocal elements of the
community. . . 'find it hard to raise their voices on the one issue over which, in
the present scheme of things, they can lose most of all.'
JONATHAN KOZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES 199-200 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
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least advantaged students, the state might redistribute educa-
tional resources by taking some resources away from more ad-
vantaged students.'8 Most would agree that public school stu-
dents who happened to be in a better position should not be
deprived of their resources. 19 Thus, a remedy for an unconstitu-
tional education system that would require the state to focus
more attention and funding on the least advantaged students
and schools-those who have fewer natural assets-would strike
at the very heart of most people's notion of "liberty." After all,
just because some students happened to end up in a wealthier
school district does not mean they should be punished by being
deprived of educational opportunities.
Before agreeing to a minimum baseline of educational
equality, however, we must recognize that a system in which a
student's natural position in life works to the student's advan-
tage could create wide gaps between classes based on irrelevant
factors. Equal educational opportunity could become an "equal
chance to leave the less fortunate behind in the personal quest
for influence and social position."20
Operating from an objective perspective, we would not
choose a system allowing some students disparately more oppor-
tunities to advance than others because we could end up a dis-
advantaged student trapped in a financially strapped school.
We would likewise reject a system requiring strict equality of
dollars because it would likely require stripping resources from
some more advantaged schools, one of which may be our own. In
18. Montana constitutional convention delegates voiced this concern: "[W]e recognize
that, if in the future it is required that education be equalized across the districts, that
this could jeopardize the quality of education, and we would not want to see this happen.
And this is what we wish to safeguard against." VI CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 1960
(statement of Delegate Harbaugh).
19. Kozol observes that society's fear of equalizing down is not unique to the school
funding issue, but part of a greater societal pattern of prioritizing personal advancement
over the greater good:
[WThile, on a lofty level, wealthy districts may be fighting in defense of a su-
perb abstraction-'liberty,' 'local control,' or such-on a mundane level they are
fighting for the right to guarantee their children the inheritance of an ascen-
dant role in our society. There is a deep-seated reverence for fair play in the
United States, and in many areas of life we see the consequences in a genuine
distaste for loaded dice; but this is not the case in education, health care, or in-
heritance of wealth. In these elemental areas we want the game to be unfair
and we have made it so; and it will likely so remain.
KOZOL, supra note 17, at 223. Since our advocacy is once removed-we don't advocate
for personal advancement, but rather our child's best interests-living with a system
that allows some children opportunities far beyond others is even easier.
20. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 91.
Vol. 65348
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contrast, we would welcome a system that would be sensitive to
each student's unique needs, each school's unique needs, and
that would be funded accordingly. Then no matter where we fell
in the system, we could be sure our individual needs would be
addressed. We would also choose a system that, instead of de-
creasing overall quality in the name of equality, would increase
the overall level of quality. Then, equalization would not harm
us, regardless of whether we initially had the upper hand or
were at a disadvantage. Based on these foundational principles,
we can analyze Montana's system of funding public schools to
determine if it creates an injustice for Montana's children.
II. HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF MONTANA EDUCATION
A. Territorial Montana
One early Montanan painted a rosy picture of the future of
Montana's education system in an 1865 editorial:
In every inhabited spot, let schools be erected. Humble and defi-
cient in many respects they must be, at first, but in a marvellously
short time, if the endeavors of the mothers and fathers of Montana
are persistent and well directed, a school system shall arise in our
midst, worthy of our name and station, and the riches our children
will inherit will fall into hands fitted to receive them, and to apply
them intelligently for their good and the welfare of the lands of
their birth.2'
Local support and control of small school districts was the natu-
ral beginning to public education in Montana's territorial his-
tory.22 The first School Act in 1865 provided for funding from
three sources: sale of public lands,23 a mandatory one-mill tax
21. SIEVERS, supra note 7, at 13 (quoting Editorial, MONTANA POST, Sept. 9, 1865).
Bruce Sievers was a research analyst on the Constitutional Convention Commission cre-
ated by the 1971 Legislative Assembly. STUDY No. 17 was created for the Montana Con-
stitutional Convention delegates.
The delegates to the 1971-1972 Montana Constitutional Convention will need
historical, legal and comparative information about the Montana Constitution.
Recognizing this need, the 1971 Legislative Assembly created the Constitu-
tional Convention Commission and directed it to assemble and prepare essen-
tial information for the Convention. This series of reports by the Commission
is in fulfillment of that responsibility.
Id. at iii.
22. Id. at 13.
23. C.R. ANDERSON, KNOW YOUR SCHOOLS: PUBLIC EDUCATION IN MONTANA 15
(1972). The public lands were provided by the federal government specifically for public
2004 349
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levy reserved for teachers' salaries, and allocation of criminal
fines.24 Individual families were expected to provide students'
necessary books and supplies.25 The state's duty to financially
provide for a common school system was recognized in territorial
statutes, but had no effect before statehood. 26
The quality and efficiency of the public educational system
quickly became a concern in Montana. Because of sparse popu-
lation and minimal centralized administration, a primary chal-
lenge in the territorial days was the expense of providing teach-
ers' salaries and school buildings to the increasing number of
small rural schools. 27 Superintendents began to call on the peo-
ple for more tax support, and they stressed the importance of a
more centralized and uniform system of schools. 28
B. Early Statehood
The state's role in providing financial support for public
education was constitutionally recognized in Montana's initial
stages of statehood beginning in 1889; its importance was car-
ried over from the territorial emphasis on the necessity of an
educated population. 29 In fact, the 1889 Constitution included a
guarantee that the state would provide financial assistance to
the public schools. 30 Article XI mandated that the legislature
"establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system
of public, free, common schools" which "shall be open to all chil-
dren and youth between the ages of six and twenty-one years.
'
"31
education purposes, however no funds were derived from the lands until after Montana
became a state. Id.
24. Id. Taxation was not a reliable source of funding because the mandated rate was
not always applied or collected equally. Id. at 24.
25. Id. at 18.
26. SIEVERS, supra note 7, at 12-13 (citing THE ORGANIC ACT OF THE TERRITORY OF
MONTANA OF 1864).
27. Id. at 13-14. Territorial Superintendent Hedges identified substandard school
buildings, inadequate school terms, and unqualified teachers as some of the primary
concerns during his term. Id. at 14. Some territorial schools educated as few as two
students. Id.
28. Id. at 13-14.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id. at 14; MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 6 (1889). Article XI, section 5 mandated distri-
bution of funds "in proportion to the number of children and youths between the ages of
six (6) and twenty-one (21) residing therein respectively." MONT. CONST. art. XI, § 5
(1889).
31. MONT. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1, 7 (1889). The territorial difficulty with small rural
schools underscores the language of the 1889 constitutional education provision. Uni-
formity and centralization were of paramount concern; the cost of keeping a small school
Vol. 65350
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Despite this mandate, public education continued to be funded
substantially by individual communities within counties and
school districts. 32
By the 1900s, funding inadequacies were already making
their way to the courts.33 Nevertheless, the Montana public
school system basked in the light of national recognition in 1919,
when a study of state education systems placed Montana first in
the nation for financial support of public education.34 Although
there was some concern that the report would breed compla-
cency and stem the progress in Montana's schools, 35 writings of
the time describe a different reaction. Shortly after the report
was published, a questionnaire was given to superintendents
and principals in the state, exploring the reactions from individ-
ual school systems to the statistical findings. 36 The responses
showed increased public interest in the education system since
the report, and recognition of the challenges that Montana
would face in the future:
In general Ayres' study had distinctly helped to increase public in-
terest. It had not produced any community self-complacency. To
the question of the validity and usefulness of the index number for
determining educational advancement and achievement, there
was a frank and discriminating reaction. Almost without excep-
tion, it was emphasized that the index number, in the form pro-
posed by Dr. Ayres, omitted many of the vital factors of efficient
education. The quality and method of instruction, the extent of
supervision, the training and competency of teachers, the variety
of educational opportunity, and the success of teaching as deter-
mined by its measured results, were most frequently specified.3 7
Montanans appeared to recognize that substantial problems
open did not decrease simply because only two pupils attended. SIEVERS, supra note 7,
at 14.
32. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 7 Mont. Educ. Law 14, 16 (1st
Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 13, 1988).
33. See Jay v. Sch. Dist. No. 1 of Cascade County, 24 Mont. 219, 61 P. 250 (1900). In
Jay, a public school teacher sued district trustees for her salary, which had not been paid
due to lack of school funds. Id., 24 Mont. at 221, 61 P. at 250. A local bank was paying
teachers' salaries, and teachers were then assigning their claims against the district to
the bank. Id. The court held that since the trustees are not given funding power, "[it is
the fault of the legislature or the taxing authorities that ample means are not provided
to continue the schools." Id., 24 Mont. at 231, 61 P. at 254.
34. SIEVERS, supra note 7, at 15. The "Ayres Report" was published by the Russell
Sage Foundation. Id.
35. Id.
36. Edward C. Elliott, The Ranking of Montana's Educational System, 62 EDUC. REV.
91, 94-95 (Sept. 1921).
37. Id. at 95.
2004
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loomed in the background of their purported national success. 38
Seven years later, another national study ranked Montana thir-
teenth in financial educational support.39
The difficulties of equitably supporting both rural and non-
rural districts became more pronounced over time.40 As in the
territorial days, a great portion of the school-aged children in
Montana remained in poor, rural school districts. 41 With local
taxpayers continuing to assume the bulk of educational ex-
penses, more populous districts were inevitably far better
funded than small rural districts. 42 In 1927, the legislature at-
tempted to address these problems by establishing a State
Common School Equalization Fund.43 The equalization fund
was designed to make up for lack of financial support in the
smaller rural school districts, and it was somewhat successful in
that goal.44 However, overall financial support waned over the
next few years, and the education system took a downward spi-
ral into the Depression and World War II.45
C. The School Foundation Program
The state eventually recognized the inequality created by
local funding and took on a greater funding role through the
School Foundation Program, enacted in 1949.46 The Foundation
38. See id. at 93 ("Neither was Montana misled into believing that her full duty had
yet been done for the educational welfare of the thousands of children of the sparsely set-
tled rural reaches of the state . . . ."); SIEVERS, supra note 7, at 15 ("[I]n 1924, . . . one
Montana county had, in terms of wealth behind each teacher, a district with a figure of
$225,000 and a second district with less than $25,000." (quoting Lyle L. Berg, Montana
Department of Public Instruction, in EDUCATION IN THE STATES: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND OUTLOOK 713 (Jim B. Pearson & Edgar Fuller eds., NEA 1969)).
39. SIEVERS, supra note 7, at 15.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 1927 Mont. Laws 119. The "classroom unit" was the first object through which
the state distributed funds to schools. 1935 Mont. Laws 175; see also Andrea Merrill,
The Montana School Foundation Program and State Equalization Aid: A Legislative and
Financial History, 1949-1991, at 3 (April 1992) (Prepared for the Joint Interim Subcom-
mittee on School Funding), available at http://leg.state.mt.us/content/publications/
research/past interim/fdnprog.pdf.
44. SIEVERS, supra note 7, at 16.
45. See id.; Merrill, supra note 43, at 2 (noting "meager commitments to the public
schools on the part of both society and government" due to a decade of "general economic
hardship, drought and its consequences for the agricultural sector, and years of war ef-
fort").
46. SIEVERS, supra note 7, at 16.
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Program began with a team of nine people commissioned by the
legislature to study education reform in Montana in 1945.47
Their recommendations formed the basis for the Foundation
Program, adopted in full in 1949.48
Under the Foundation Program, each school district was
guaranteed a minimum amount of funding called the "minimum
foundation program."49 The minimum amount was based on a
district's "Average Number Belonging," essentially a count of the
students enrolled and attending each school in the district dur-
ing a specified time.50 The original amount of per-student fund-
ing was based on studies of how much school districts had spent
during the mid-1940s.51
Each county imposed a tax of a set number of mills to raise
minimum foundation funds.5 2 To fill in the deficiency between
the county levy and the minimum foundation program, the state
paid an amount up to fifty percent of the total statewide founda-
tion program guarantee.5 3 If still short of the minimum founda-
tion amount, the district had to levy more taxes to make up the
difference. 54 Each school district could impose an additional lim-
ited tax-called a "permissive levy"-to raise funds above the
minimum guaranteed foundation amount.55 Beyond the permis-
sive levy, a school district could raise unlimited funds with voter
approval--called the "unlimited voted levy."56
The goal of the Foundation Program was to provide each
school with "the amount required to operate and maintain an
adequate and efficient school. ' 57 Almost immediately, however,
the Foundation Program gave rise to issues of both educational
equality and educational quality in Montana. Basing the
amount distributed per student on what districts were already
47. Merrill, supra note 43, at 1-2.
48. Id. at 3-4.
49. Id. at 4.
50. See 1947 Mont. Laws 272; Merrill, supra note 43, at 5. The ANB student count
replaced the "classroom unit" count through which the first equalization fund distributed
funds. Id. at 3.
51. Merrill, supra note 43, at 5.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 8. The permissive levy was limited to the lesser of thirty percent of its
guaranteed foundation amount or 15 mills in an elementary district, and twenty-five
percent of its foundation amount or ten mills in a high school district.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 4.
2004 353
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spending assumed that, in the mid-1940s, each district received
adequate funds to provide for pupils' educational needs and had
spent accordingly. However, the Foundation Program commit-
tee was originally commissioned "to stem what was termed at
the time a 'crisis situation' in the quality of Montana schools."58
Thus, the very foundation of the Foundation Program was arbi-
trarily set. Rather than studying the actual cost of providing a
"general, uniform and thorough system of public, free, common
schools"--the 1889 constitutional mandate-the committee re-
lied on amounts spent per student during an educational crisis
situation.
The Foundation Program was designed to equalize funding,
but over time it began to embed more of the same funding ine-
quality into the public school system.59 The primary problem
was that local districts were responsible for providing any
amount over the guaranteed minimum funding level through
permissive and voted mill levies.60 Thus, as the state funded
less of a district's total budget, that district was forced to burden
local property taxpayers more. Since property values naturally
differed between districts, some districts were able to raise more
dollars-per-mill than others, and with significantly less tax bur-
den.61 For example, between 1950 and 1986, the amount of state
funds for elementary and secondary schools fell from 81.2% to
between 54% and 58% of total funding.62 School districts began
to offer students widely different opportunities because prop-
erty-rich districts63 were able to raise substantially more funds,
and thus equip their schools for a variety of programs the prop-
erty-poor districts had to rule out.M
Declining state support of public schools prompted the state
to begin legislatively and administratively analyzing its funding
scheme. Between 1957 and 1991, the legislature, the Office of
Public Instruction, and the Board of Public Education completed
58. Id. at 2.
59. SIEVERS, supra note 7, at 16-17.
60. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 47-48, 769 P.2d
684, 686 (1989), amended by 236 Mont. 61, 769 P.2d 684 (1990).
61. See id., 236 Mont. at 48-49, 769 P.2d at 686-87 (affirming unchallenged findings
of District Court regarding differences in funding levels due to differences in taxable
valuation in each district).
62. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 7 Mont. Educ. Law 14, 19 (1st
Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 13, 1988).
63. See discussion infra Part V regarding property-rich and property-poor districts.
64. See Helena Elementary, 7 Mont. Educ. Law at 19; see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 117-119.
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a number of school funding studies.65 Very few of the studies re-
sulted in substantial revision to state guaranteed funding
amounts. None of the studies resulted in legislative action
based on the cost of providing "quality education" to Montana
students.
A study conducted in 1960-1961 resulted in revision to per-
pupil funding levels, but was based on the cost of meeting ac-
creditation standards in force at the time. 66 The School Founda-
tion Program Study Committee compared actual costs of school
district "essentials" in 1949 and 1962.67 The committee found
that "Montana districts could have been justified to spend 2.75
times as much in response to the real effects of the inflation
rate, enrollment increases, and state and national educational
program expectations."68 The committee recommended increas-
ing guaranteed state funding levels accordingly.
In 1973, the Senate ordered the Board of Public Education
to define "basic quality education" under the new 1972 Constitu-
tion.69 Reporting to the Forty-Fifth Legislature in 1975, the
Board of Public Education defined "basic quality education" as
follows: "A basic quality education is a process which can enable
students to transform their potential into actuality."70 Along
with this definition, the Board reported "eight curricular dimen-
sions" and made numerous recommendations to the legislature,
including a recommendation to adjust per-pupil funding
amounts according to the cost of providing necessary resources.71
During the same session, the Office of Public Instruction (OPI)
recommended another increase in per-pupil funding based on
65. See Merrill, supra note 43.
66. See id. at 14; 1963 Mont. Laws 267. Similar to the Montana Supreme Court's
finding in Helena Elementary that districts were not spending school funds on "frills,"
236 Mont. at 54, 769 P.2d at 690, the School Foundation Program Study Committee
found that "at least 70 percent of average district general fund expenditures went toward
mandated instructional costs, textbooks, and supplies." Merrill, supra note 43, at 14
(emphasis added).
67. See Merrill, supra note 43, at 13. The recommendations were enacted in Chapter
267, Laws of Montana 1963. See also Merrill, supra note 43, at 13-14. The interim
committee was made up of legislators, educators, and others-seventy-one members in
all. Id. at 13.
68. Merrill, supra note 43, at 13.
69. Id. at 24 (citing S. Res. 14, 1973 Leg., 43d Sess. (Mont. 1973)). Although the
study, authorized by senate resolution in the 1973 session, was completed, there is no
record of the authorizing resolution in the published Laws of Montana.
70. Id. at 26. According to Merrill, the definition was criticized as being too vague
and outcome-based. Id.
71. Id. at 26.
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analysis of actual district expenditures. 72 The legislature in-
creased per-pupil funds according to OPI's recommendation.
73
In 1979, OPI again recommended increased per-pupil fund-
ing in response to another study showing expenditures had in-
creased beyond the guaranteed funding level.74 In addition, OPI
recommended an annual study of expenditures in order to guide
funding increases. 75  The legislature enacted OPI's recom-
mended per-pupil increases, 76 but did not implement the sug-
gested annual expenditure review.
No other studies resulted in either a legislative definition of
"quality education," or a cost-based revision to per-pupil fund-
ing.77  Although the legislature mandated more studies in
1987-one by the Board of Public Education to define a "basic
education," and one by a subcommittee to study the costs of
meeting current accreditation standards-findings of both stud-
ies were overshadowed by the Helena Elementary case and sub-
sequent legislative response. 78
III. MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND
INTERPRETATION
A. Montana Constitutional Education Provisions
The Montana Constitution explicitly states that Montana
citizens are guaranteed "equal educational opportunity."79 The
constitution also states that the legislature has a duty to provide
a "basic system of free quality public elementary and secondary
72. Id. at 25-26.
73. 1975 Mont. Laws 518.
74. Merrill, supra note 43, at 28-29.
75. Id. at 29.
76. 1979 Mont. Laws 481; Merrill, supra note 43, at 30.
77. See generally Merrill, supra note 43.
78. See id. at 38-45 (discussing the two studies, the Helena Elementary decisions, and'
the legislative response to those decisions); see also Hearing on H.B. 3 Before the House
Comm. on Educ. and Cultural Res., 1989 Leg., 51st Sess. 4-7 (Mont. June 20, 1989) (dis-
cussing House Bill 3 which attempted to define "basic education"). The bill was tabled in
committee the next day, partly due the absence of any reference to "quality" in the bill.
See, e.g., id. at 5 (Pat Melby comparing H.B. 3 to the 1973 legislatively mandated defini-
tion of the Board of Public Education which defined "basic quality education"); id. at 6
(Kay McKenna discussing differences in "basic quality education" for different age
groups).
79. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1) ("Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to
each person of the state.").
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schools."80 Both the text of Montana's education clause and the
history of its formation show the state has two obligations with
regard to public education: (1) an obligation to maintain a cer-
tain standard of educational quality across the state; and (2) an
obligation to offer an equal opportunity to receive an education
at that standard.
The framers understood equal educational opportunity to
mean not just an equal opportunity to an education in general,
but an equal opportunity to an education of basically equal qual-
ity.8 1 Bruce Sievers, in his study written for the constitutional
convention delegates, noted the pros and cons of guaranteeing
equal educational opportunity in the Montana constitution.8 2
One interest was in keeping the new constitution concise and
easy to interpret, which, according to Sievers, weighed against
including an equal educational opportunity guarantee.8 3 How-
ever, Sievers reasoned that a guarantee of equal educational op-
portunity "would provide a general statement of aim for the en-
tire educational system, including its methods of financing."8 4
He also reminded delegates of the recent California Supreme
Court equal protection decision Serrano v. Priest, which made a
constitutional statement of equal protection principles "perti-
nent at this time, whereas it was not before."8 5
Ultimately, the framers opted to include a general principle
80. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3).
81. In his essay, Equal Educational Opportunity, prepared for the constitutional
delegates, Bruce Sievers wrote: "[Tihe right to an equal educational opportunity merges
into the right to a substantially equal education .... Equal educational opportunity
thus has come to mean in the modern context not only that everyone deserves an equal
opportunity for an education but that everyone should have the opportunity for an equal
(basic) education." SIEVERS, supra note 7, at 48-49.
82. Id. at 61.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. While Montana's constitutional convention was meeting, the national public
school community was abuzz about Serrano v. Priest, in which the California Supreme
Court held the state's school finance system unconstitutional as a violation of both fed-
eral and state equal protection provisions. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). In Serrano, the
court found California's funding system made education a "function of... wealth." Id. at
1244. Sievers summarized Serrano in his report to the delegates. SIEVERS, supra note 7,
at 57-59. The delegates also referred to Serrano during the convention. See, e.g., VI
CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 1948 ("Delegate Champoux: ... The most significant revi-
sions [to the 1889 Constitution] are a clear statement of educational goals of the state, a
mandate for the support of education allowing increased financial flexibility-and this
was an extremely difficult one in light of the Serrano case ....").
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of educational equality in article X, section 1(1).86 In discussing
article X, section 1(1), the convention delegates expressed con-
cerns about the state's financial limitations,87 but stressed the
importance of equality of educational standards across the state.
Delegate Harbaugh stated:
[T]he [Education and Public Lands Committee] does wish to take
the position that equality of educational opportunity is a funda-
mental right of all. And the time is long past when the state can
afford to promote one standard of education for those who are
members of one geographical area or economic or cultural group
and a different standard for those who are members of some other
geographical area or economic or cultural group within the borders
of this state.88
Delegates sent an explanatory packet to voters before the ratifi-
cation election, explaining that article X, section 1 "[c]reates a
right to equal educational opportunity."89
Although one might interpret "quality" as a neutral term, it
did not hold a neutral meaning for the framers. 90 In its majority
proposal to the convention, the Education and Public Lands
Committee stated: "What do we mean by the words 'high-
quality'? They've been used as an instruction here to the Legis-
lature to provide not just a minimum education system, a sub-
86. Sievers offered Montana delegates the New York 1967 proposed constitutional
provision as an example: "Equality of educational opportunity shall be guaranteed to all
the people of the state. The Legislature shall provide necessary programs to develop the
educational potential of each person." SIEVERS, supra note 7, at 61. Article X, section
1(1) of the Montana Constitution is a nearly identical provision: "It is the goal of the peo-
ple to establish a system of education which will develop the full educational potential of
each person. Equality of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the
state." While Montana voters accepted the new guarantee of equal educational opportu-
nity, New York voters did not, rejecting the 1967 proposed constitution. See N.Y. CONST.
art. XI, § 1.
87. Delegate Harbaugh stated that the guarantee would be limited by "the ability of
the state to finance a system of education which guarantees equality; and where the
state can show a compelling cause-compelling state interest, such as the preservation of
the economic welfare of the state, this would be a limiting factor imposed upon this
guarantee." VI CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 1950. This view, however, was notably
rejected by the Montana Supreme Court in Helena Elementary, 236 Mont. at 53, 769
P.2d at 689-90 ("We hold that the last sentence of subsection (3) is not a limiting provi-
sion on the guarantee of equal educational opportunity contained in subsection (1).").
88. VI CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 1950.
89. Proposed 1972 Constitution for the State of Montana: Official Text with Explana-
tion (Mont. Const'l Convention 1972) (on file with author).
90. The technical definition of "quality" is also not uniformly neutral. Webster de-
fines the adjective "quality" as "being of high quality." Merriam-Webster OnLine Dic-
tionary, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary. This fits well with the Committee's
revision removing "high" from "high-quality" due to redundancy. See infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
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standard system, but one that meets a contemporary need and is
capable of producing well-informed citizens."91  Originally
drafted as "high-quality," the committee's proposal was later
amended, apparently only to take out what it viewed as redun-
dant wording: "It seems obvious that we don't need 'high' when
we're talking about quality, because it contains the same lan-
guage."92
B. Judicial and Legislative Interpretation
State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub93 was the first school fund-
ing dispute to reach the Montana Supreme Court after Montana
adopted the 1972 Constitution. Plaintiffs challenged the newly
enacted Chapter 355, Laws of Montana 1973, which formed the
basis for the school funding system under the new constitution.94
They claimed that if Montana schools were compared with one
another, it would be clear that some schools offered more educa-
tional opportunities than others because of funding disparities,
that Foundation Program funding was being distributed arbi-
trarily, and that a cap on school budget increases "locked those
schools with substandard programs into a position of permanent
inequality of educational opportunity."95 The court agreed that
some of the allegations may be true.96 However, the court was
constrained to review the legislation without the benefit of out-
side evidence proving the law's inequality or inadequacy as ap-
plied.97 Ultimately, the court held the Foundation Program un-
der Chapter 355 was "a rational method of providing the
91. VI CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 1960 (Delegate Harbaugh describing the major-
ity proposal).
92. Id. at 1975 (statement of Delegate Martin).
93. 164 Mont. 141, 520 P.2d 776 (1974).
94. Id., 164 Mont. at 143, 520 P.2d at 777. Plaintiffs alleged that the legislation vio-
lated article X, section 1. Id., 164 Mont. at 145, 520 P.2d at 778. The court rejected
plaintiffs' argument that because the legislature chose to use a new method of funding
schools-property taxation-it was failing to meet its duty to fully fund the education
system. Id., 164 Mont. at 148-49, 520 P.2d at 780. The court also rejected the taxpayer
inequity argument that the statewide property tax for public education was invalid be-
cause certain taxpayers did not receive direct personal benefit from the tax. Id., 164
Mont. at 149-51, 520 P.2d at 781-82.
95. Id., 164 Mont. at 152-53, 520 P.2d at 782.
96. Id., 164 Mont. at 152, 520 P.2d at 782 ("[R]espondents maintained that a com-
parison of curricula would demonstrate a wide disparity in the educational opportunities
offered by different schools. No doubt this is true. No doubt other comparisons could be
made which would show differences in educational opportunity.").
97. Id., 164 Mont. at 153, 520 P.2d at 782.
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required basic public education."98
In Straub, the court cited San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez99 in which the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the Constitution only required the legisla-
ture to adopt a "rational method" of funding public schools. 100
However, the guarantee of equal educational opportunity in the
newly ratified Montana Constitution was a stark contrast to the
federal Constitution in that it provided a positive guarantee of
rights.1 1 Montana courts recognized this fact in the late 1980s
in Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State,0 2 when
plaintiffs provided ample evidence to support the inequities al-
luded to but not directly addressed in Straub. In 1985, sixty-five
public school districts, and eight individual parents of students
in various school districts filed suit against the State, the Mon-
tana Board of Public Education, and the Superintendent of Pub-
lic Instruction. 0 3 The Plaintiffs alleged Foundation Program
funding violated article II, section 4, and article X of the Mon-
tana Constitution. 0 4
District Judge Loble heard the case and declared education
a fundamental right under the Montana Constitution. 10 5 He
found that education formed a crucial foundation to an individ-
ual's prospects in life: "The quality of an individual's life is in-
creasingly dependent on the level and quality of that individ-
ual's education."1 06 Students in poorer school districts were
being deprived of that important right under the state's public
funding scheme, "regardless of the efforts made by local admin-
98. Id., 164 Mont. at 153, 520 P.2d at 783 (noting the per student basis of distribu-
tion, slightly larger allowance for smaller schools, provision for budget increases with
enrollment increases, and empowerment of the trustees to supplement the local budget
with permissive local levies). The court specified that it was "not foreclosing a considera-
tion of the foundation program and the budget limitations of Chapter 355 as applied,"
and it noted that "no assertions of substandard programs" had been made in this case.
Id., 164 Mont. at 153-54, 520 P.2d at 782-83.
99. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
100. Straub, 164 Mont. at 153, 520 P.2d at 782.
101. The United States Supreme Court did not find a guarantee of equal educational
opportunity in the federal Constitution (or constitutional penumbras) in Rodriguez. See
411 U.S. at 35.
102. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 7 Mont. Educ. Law 14, 27 (1st
Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 13, 1988).
103. Id. There were 35 elementary and 30 secondary school districts party to the suit.
104. Id. at 28. Article II, section 4 is Montana's equal protection clause.
105. Id. at 86.
106. Id. at 28-29
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istrators and teachers."10 7 According to Judge Loble, poorer stu-
dents were being "shortchanged.' 0 8 He concluded that "dollars
make a difference in the quality of educational opportunities af-
forded in Montana's schools." 0 9
Judge Loble held that the public school funding scheme vio-
lated the Montana Constitution. 0 He made explicit findings to
support his conclusion, but he did not provide or define a specific
remedy.1 1' Using an equal protection analysis, Judge Loble held
that any disparity between districts in per-pupil expenditures
"may be permissible if they are the result of, and are closely tai-
lored to, educationally-relevant factors."112 He ordered that his
decision be "prospective" and have a delayed effect, "in order to
provide the Legislature with the opportunity to search for and
present an equitable system of school financing in this State."" 3
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed Judge
Loble's conclusion that the state's system of funding public
schools was unconstitutional. 1 4 Like Judge Loble, the supreme
court left the remedy entirely to the legislature." 5
The court "specifically affirmed" Loble's conclusion of law
that "spending differences among similarly sized school districts
in the State result in unequal educational opportunities for stu-
dents."" 6 The court noted evidence from two teams of experts
showing that "better-funded" schools offered more and better
curricula, equipment, and facilities to students than schools of
similar size with less funding.117 For example, wealthier school
districts consistently offered more and better-equipped opportu-
107. Id. at 22.
108. Helena Elementary, 7 Mont. Educ. Law at 20.
109. Id. at 81.
110. Id. at 22.
111. Id. at 22-23 ("Solutions to the problems inherent in Montana's school finance sys-
tem are not simple. However, they can be solved. It would be presumptuous of me to
order specific remedies at this time. Those solutions must await careful study by the
Legislature with the assistance of administrators, State executives, and other profes-
sionals.").
112. Id. at 86 (noting local property wealth is "absolutely irrelevant to education").
113. Id. at 90. Judge Loble set October 1, 1989, as the effective date of his decision
rendered in January of 1988.
114. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 55, 769 P.2d 684, 690
(1989), amended by 236 Mont. 61, 769 P.2d 684 (1990).
115. Id., 236 Mont. at 59, 769 P.2d at 693. The Supreme Court extended the effective
date of its decision to July 1, 1989, again in order to allow the legislature to bring the
funding system into compliance.
116. Id., 236 Mont. at 51, 769 P.2d at 688.
117. Id., 236 Mont. at 48-52, 769 P.2d at 686-89.
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nities in areas of scientific studies,118 hands-on learning experi-
ences, foreign language, physical education, music, art, gifted
and talented programs, technological resources, library and me-
dia resources, and extracurricular activities. 1 9
The court emphasized the clear equality standard mandated
by the Montana Constitution. "We conclude that the plain
meaning of the second sentence of subsection (1) is that each
person is guaranteed equality of educational opportunity.' ' 20 It
found this the only place where the constitution "'guarantees' a
particular right."121
The State argued that its only constitutional obligation was
equitable distribution of available funds. Reiterating that all
parties agreed the Foundation Program funds had been equita-
bly distributed, the State maintained it had fulfilled its constitu-
tional obligation. 22 However, the court rejected the notion that
equitably distributing "available funds" resulted in equal educa-
tional opportunity.' 23 It noted the Foundation Program had
been inadequately funded, and as such, it did not even meet
minimum accreditation standards-standards the court con-
cluded did not rise to the level of "quality education." 24 Here
the court impliedly confirmed the presence of a minimum ade-
quacy standard in conjunction with the equality standard it had
already found.
The court also rejected the State's argument that fiscal dif-
ficulties or the policy of local control alleviated its funding duty.
It held statewide economic hardships did not "justify perpetuat-
ing inequities." 25  Likewise, article X, section 8, providing for
trustee supervision and control of school districts, did not allow
118. The study found that science labs were "typically larger, better stocked with more
equipment and consumable supplies, with more storage, and generally more functional
than those in poorer districts." Id., 236 Mont. at 50, 769 P.2d at 687-88.
119. Id., 236 Mont. at 50-51, 769 P.2d at 687-88. The court also adopted the finding
that "[w]ith respect to facilities, high expenditure districts reported that they have not
had to defer necessary maintenance or work projects due to a lack of funds, as have low
expenditure districts." Id., 236 Mont. at 51, 769 P.2d at 688.
120. Id., 236 Mont. at 53, 769 P.2d at 689 (emphasis in original).
121. Id.
122. Id. The State asked the court to interpret the last sentence of article X, section 1,
subsection 3-"It shall fund and distribute in an equitable manner to the school districts
the state's share of the cost of the basic elementary and secondary school system"-as a
limitation of the guarantee in subsection 1. Id. The court unequivocally rejected the ar-
gument. Id., 236 Mont. at 53, 769 P.2d at 689-90.
123. Id., 236 Mont. at 53, 769 P.2d at 689.
124. Id., 236 Mont. at 54, 769 P.2d at 690.
125. Id.
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the legislature to close its eyes to spending disparities between
districts.126
Ultimately, the court did not clearly address the relation-
ship between quality and equality. It used evidence of spending
disparities between districts to support its conclusion that the
State had "failed to provide a system of quality public educa-
tion."1 27 However, it did not discuss differing costs between dis-
tricts caused by greater concentration of students with special
educational needs, high local costs, or other factors. The court
recognized that per-student expenditure was only one object of
distribution, and not the only element of a "quality education or
of equal educational opportunity. '128 Without offering any guid-
ance on how per-student expenditure bore on the issue of qual-
ity, however, the court left the legislature with no standard but
strict equality against which to measure the system and fashion
a remedy.
The Fifty-First Legislature in the June 1989 Special Session
responded to Helena Elementary with House Bill 28.129 House
Bill 28 was intended to increase the overall level of funding
while bringing similarly-sized school districts onto a near-equal
expenditure level. 130 The legislature's stated intent was to "pro-
vide greater equalization of the funding available to school dis-
tricts and to promote equalization of school district expenditures
per student."' 31
On paper, the legislature appeared to recognize the idea
that funding with equal dollars would not necessarily result in
equal educational opportunity. It explained the disparities al-
lowed by minimum and maximum budget limitations as "rea-
sonable and necessary" in order to provide "each district board of
trustees the power to determine and meet the unique and indi-
vidual needs of students and schools in the district."132 Confu-
sion evidently remained, however, on the issues of funding ade-
quacy and whether the constitution required strict equality of
126. Id. The court further noted: "In fact, as the District Court correctly found, the
present system of funding may be said to deny to poorer school districts a significant
level of local control, because they have fewer options due to fewer resources." Id.
127. Id., 236 Mont. at 55, 769 P.2d at 690.
128. Id., 236 Mont. at 55, 769 P.2d at 691.
129. 1989 Mont. Laws 11 (codified in scattered sections throughout titles 2, 7, 15, 17,
20, 23, and 90).
130. Id.
131. Id. (also noting intent to "preserve local control of the public school system").
132. Id.
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dollars per pupil. As is clear from its stated intent, the legisla-
ture still held to the concept that equitable distribution of avail-
able funds would meet its constitutional duty, and that the ul-
timate goal was a system that provided strict equality of per-
pupil expenditures.
Perhaps in conjunction with the percentage increase in
Foundation Program funding, the legislative response to Helena
Elementary was an attempt at meeting both an adequacy and
equality standard. After all, the state increased overall funding
and made provisions designed to bring the poorer and wealthier
school districts closer together in per-pupil spending. But there
was still an important gap between understanding that equality
of dollars would result in neither equal educational opportunity
nor educational quality, and carrying that understanding into
legislative action.
In fact, legislative inaction resulted in two more school
funding suits tried in early 1993.133 Plaintiffs' arguments in
those cases focused not only on unequal expenditures between
districts, but also on the foundation of per-pupil funding. 13
4
Specifically, the Montana Rural Education Association argued
the legislature should be basing per-pupil funding amounts on
costs of school district services, not on studies of past school dis-
trict expenditures. 135
The two new funding suits were mooted by legislative en-
actment of House Bill 667, the basis for Montana's current fund-
ing system. 136 The legislature's stated intent for enacting House
Bill 667 focused primarily on issues of equality.
WHEREAS, for these purposes, the Legislature determines that
the foundation program funding mechanism of the past 4 decades
be replaced with a public school funding system designed to yield
greater equalization of both district general fund budgets per-ANB
and district taxpayer efforts within a reasonable number of
133. Mont. Rural Educ. Ass'n v. State, No. BDV-91-2065 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. July
22, 1993) (Combined Order Concerning Mootness Issue) [hereinafter "Combined Order"],
available at http://www.statereporter.com; Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State,
No. BDV-91-1334 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. July 22, 1993) (Combined Order Concerning
Mootness Issue) [hereinafter "Combined Order"], available at http://www.statereporter
.com. Both were tried in front of District Court Judge Sherlock, who also adjudicated the
most current funding suit in Montana.
134. See Combined Order, supra note 133.
135. See id.
136. See id. ("It is the contention of the State that passage of House Bill 667 has so
changed the provisions of the school funding system set forth in House Bill 28 that these
cases are moot. This Court agrees.").
Vol. 65364
22
Montana Law Review, Vol. 65 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/5
EDUCATION IN MONTANA
years .... 137
Again, equalization of per-pupil dollars was of primary concern.
Committee minutes during the regular and special sessions
of 1993 show legislators struggling with the issue of defining the
constitutional mandate, and with the issues of adequacy raised
by the two new funding suits-whether the per-pupil funding
amounts were "fair" or "justified."138 Although the House Select
School Funding Committee minutes show the Board of Public
Education had recently adopted another definition of "basic
quality education" in October of 1992, the definition was not re-
counted in detail, nor explicitly made a part of the new funding
system. 139 Despite hearing from experts regarding the unjusti-
fied foundation of per-pupil funding amounts, and the need for a
current cost-of-education study,140 no such study was completed
before the legislature redesigned the funding scheme.
One interaction in committee-when the Legislative Audi-
tor reported to the House Education and Cultural Resources
Committee on the technicalities of House Bill 667-is an exam-
ple of the confusion over whether equal dollars satisfied the con-
stitutional education article. The Auditor began by noting the
bill was again based on a study of existing expenditures and had
as its goal equalization of those expenditures. 141 Representative
137. 1993 Mont. Laws 633.
138. See, e.g., Committee Minutes of Select Committee on School Funding, 1993 Leg.,
53d Sess. 3 (Mont. Jan. 7, 1993) (Representative Peck suggesting the committee "priori-
tize and zero in on one issue that will make a significant contribution: analyzing the ex-
isting foundation program schedules to determine whether or not they are fair"); id.
(Representative Fagg suggesting the two primary issues were: "(1) the foundation pro-
gram and how that relates to the pending lawsuits and (2) how to address the budget
crisis and still maintain a basic quality education that meets constitutional mandates");
id. (Representative Simpkins suggesting the major issue was one of definition: 'Without
a definition, how can the legislature solve the problem?").
139. See Committee Minutes of Select Committee on School Funding, 1993 Leg., 53d
Sess. 9 (Mont. Jan. 12, 1993). The minutes indicate that, at the request of Governor
Stephens, the Board of Public Education defined "basic quality education" through a se-
ries of public hearings and written comment. Id. However, there is no detailed account
of what that definition contained. Id.
140. See, e.g., Committee Minutes of Select Committee on School Funding, 1993 Leg.,
53d Sess. 3-13 (Mont. Jan. 26, 1993) (Chip Erdman of the Montana Rural Education As-
sociation discussing need for a cost-based funding scheme including weighting per-pupil
funding amounts under the Guaranteed Tax Base to reflect different costs of larger and
smaller school districts).
141. Committee Minutes of House Education & Cultural Resources Committee, 1993
Leg., 53d Sess. 2 (Mont. Mar. 10, 1993) ("Scott Seacat [Legislative Auditor] said the con-
cept of the new school funding plan is based on an analysis of the existing expenditures
for each elementary and high school in the state."); id. at 12 (Seacat identified one re-
maining issue: "how much the legislature will define as the cost of education." He noted
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Daily observed that "on one hand, equalization has been defined
as equal dollars, but it is not certain the constitution defines it
in such a way."1 42 In response, the Auditor stated that its office
had "not attempted to do anything other than equalize the dol-
lars."1 43 Representative Simpkins then stated "the decision
upon which the plan has been based is Judge Loble's decision
which stated 'equal dollars per student' in each school cate-
gory." 44
The confusion raised by the Helena Elementary decisions
will only continue to perpetuate inequalities and inequities in
Montana school funding unless the court clarifies the dual roles
of equality and quality under the Montana Constitution.
IV. LOOKING OUTWARD FOR GUIDANCE
Certainly the conclusions of other state courts on school
funding issues depend to a large extent on the state's funding
scheme, the makeup of its population, and the proof offered in
each trial. The Montana courts' factual findings and specific
remedies will, thus, necessarily differ. However, the way other
courts frame and analyze issues of equal educational opportu-
nity can be particularly helpful in an area like school funding,
where certain issues are largely analogous throughout the na-
tion.
The New Jersey and Wyoming Supreme Courts have re-
quired their state legislatures to address both educational equal-
ity and educational adequacy in funding public schools after
finding both standards required under their state constitution
education articles. 45 The New Jersey Supreme Court decision
in Abbott v. Burke, 46 and the Wyoming Supreme Court decision
in Campbell County School District v. State,147 and the legisla-
tive response to those decisions are instructive in how courts can
clarify the relationship between equality and quality. Montana
can learn both from New Jersey and Wyoming's successes and
their downfalls over the past decades.
that "available data is based on the amounts the legislature is currently allowing dis-
tricts to spend on education.").
142. Id. at 7.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v.
State, 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).
146. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
147. 907 P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1995).
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A. New Jersey
The New Jersey Constitution mandates: "The Legislature
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and
efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all
the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen
years." 148 Although on its face this provision requires less of
both equality and quality than the Montana Constitution, the
New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the article to require at
least equality, among other objectives. 149 In Abbott v. Burke, the
New Jersey Supreme Court grappled with many of the issues
Montana faces today, and concluded the education article also
requires the state to provide a substantive level of educational
quality. 150
The New Jersey court concluded the state could and should
address both the quality of education offered in each district,
and inequality of quality between districts. 151 The court did not
require equal dollars-it recognized that such a standard could
not possibly coexist with a minimum adequacy standard because
the two are inherently contradictory. 152  Instead, the court
struck down those parts of the funding scheme that increased
financial disparities between districts, and had no "educational
or administrative justification."1 53 State aid distributed to ad-
148. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1.
149. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 367 ("[E]mbedded in the constitutional provision itself, at
least in its construction thus far by this Court, are various objectives and permissible
outcomes--equality, uniformity, diversity, and disparity-that may require.., a contin-
ued general definition of the constitutional mandate."). Although the court had con-
structed the New Jersey Constitution to include certain objectives and standards, the
legislature had been the one to substantively defined the article, and the court affirmed
and proceeded under that definition. See id. at 374 ("The substantive content of thor-
ough and efficient has been legislatively defined and sustained by this Court."); id. at
390 ("While necessarily general, the Act has fairly established the standard against
which an educational opportunity can be measured to see if it conforms to the constitu-
tional command. We found the standard constitutional in Robinson V, and reaffirm that
conclusion now."). This provides an important contrast to Montana, where the constitu-
tional mandate has yet to be substantively defined.
150. See Abbott, 575 A.2d at 367.
151. Id. at 394 ("Our conclusion that the constitutional mandate has not been satisfied
is based both on the absolute level of education in those districts and the comparison
with education in affluent suburban districts.").
152. Id. at 368 ("Equality of expenditures per pupil could not have been constitution-
ally mandated when we recognized the right of districts to spend more to address stu-
dents' special needs . . ").
153. Id. at 407 ("In effect, we hold that under the present funding scheme state aid
that is counter-equalizing, that increases funding disparities, and that has no arguable
educational or administrative justification, is unconstitutional.").
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dress the special financial needs of certain types of students was
held constitutional, even though it was not equally distributed
between districts. 154 Throughout its opinion, the court held to
the operative principle that a funding system must be sensitive
to students' special disadvantages. 155
The court declared equality of funding "one of the many fac-
tors that counts" toward meeting the state's constitutional obli-
gation.15 6 Per-student expenditure disparities bore on the case
for three reasons. First, unless the court were to conclude that
richer districts offered education at an exceptionally high level,
the lower level of spending in poorer districts proved they were
offering an inadequate quality of education. 57 Second, low dis-
trict expenditures also indicated that students in poorer districts
would "be unable to compete in society entered by the richer dis-
tricts' students." s58 Finally, years of spending disparities evi-
denced a system that was unable to correct the problem itself. 59
The court continually returned to one fundamental question: if
money doesn't make a difference in quality of education, why do
richer school districts invariably spend so much money to obtain
and implement the types of programs regarded as "indicators of
quality?"160
154. Id. at 407. Under the New Jersey funding scheme, "categorical aid" was "given by
the State to districts regardless of their wealth or the total size of their budget, based on
the recognition that certain essential programs cost more than others." Id. at 380. The
court noted that because under-funded districts generally had more students with spe-
cial needs, more categorical aid naturally went to those poorer districts. Id. at 407.
Categorical aid had the potential to create funding disparities depending on the way spe-
cial needs students were dispersed throughout districts. However, at the time it was
contributing to equalization of the districts by supplementing poorer school districts'
funding. Id.
155. See, e.g., Abbott, 575 A.2d at 363, 408 ("The level of funding must also be ade-
quate to provide for the special educational needs of these poorer urban districts in order
to redress their extreme disadvantages"); id. at 366 ("Poorer students need a special
supportive educational effort in order to give them a chance to succeed as citizens and
workers. Their educational needs are often dramatically different from those of students
in affluent districts."); and id. at 408 (poorer urban districts' "special disadvantages must
be addressed").
156. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 406.
157. Id. at 384.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., id. at 397 ("[I]f these courses-[computer science, science lab, foreign-
language, music, art, physical education]-are not integral to a thorough and efficient
education, why do the richer districts invariably offer them?"); and id. at 399 ("We return
to the plaintiffs' insistent and persuasive question: if these factors-[teacher ratios,
teacher experience, teacher salary, etc.]-are not related to the quality of education, why
are the richer districts willing to spend so much for them?" (emphasis in original).).
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In ordering a remedy the court concluded that the required
equalization effort would only be constitutionally justified if the
state "equalized up"-brought disadvantaged districts up to the
level of funding found in the more advantaged districts. 16 1 When
the court measured school funding against both an equality
standard and a quality standard, it found that for the state to
meet both standards, it had to increase funding.162
After the New Jersey Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Ab-
bott v. Burke, the legislature increased funding in poorer school
districts by $700 million dollars over four years, keeping wealth-
ier districts at the same funding level. 163 In 1994, the supreme
court again reviewed the funding scheme, noting that the in-
creased funding was a step in the right direction, but that the
state had not yet achieved compliance with the court's 1990 or-
der. 164 The court noted specific areas of non-compliance, requir-
ing full compliance by the 1997-98 school year.165 One area it
found unacceptable was the formula for weighting funding levels
for at-risk students. 166 The court highlighted the absence of leg-
islative study of the programs and services at-risk students re-
quired, and the cost of providing those programs and services. 167
Without that study, the court found the funding scheme was
doomed to fail. 68
The legislature responded with the Comprehensive Educa-
161. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 408 ("We find in order to provide a thorough and efficient edu-
cation in these poorer urban districts, the State must assure that their educational ex-
penditures per pupil are substantially equivalent to those of the more affluent suburban
districts, and that, in addition, their special disadvantages must be addressed.").
162. The New Jersey Supreme Court admittedly ordered a "sharp" remedy, requiring
substantially equal spending per pupil between "poorer urban districts" and "property-
rich districts." Id. at 408-09. However, it maintained again that funding had to be sen-
sitive to special educational needs. Id. The remedy, to a large extent, was dictated by
the record-"a special context that brings the constitutional obligation into sharp focus
as it applies to the urban poor." Id. at 411.
163. See Abbott v. Burke, 643 A.2d 575, 576 (N.J. 1994). After the 1990 decision, fund-
ing was increased through the Quality Education Act, superseded in 1996 by the Com-
prehensive Education Improvement and Financing Act. See 1996 N.J. Laws 138.
164. Abbott, 643 A.2d at 576-77.
165. Id. at 576.
166. Id. at 579.
167. Id. (noting that although legislation was passed requiring the Commissioner to
complete such a study, it was never accomplished).
168. Id. ("The record before us makes it clear that that success cannot be expected to
be realized unless the Department and the Commissioner identify and implement the
special supplemental programs and services that the children in these districts re-
quire.").
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tion Improvement and Financing Act of 1996 ("CEIF").169 One of
its features was the "Report on the Cost of Providing a Thorough
and Efficient Education," a biennially required study to be com-
pleted by the State Board of Education and the Commissioner of
Education. 170 Under the CEIF, the Commissioner of Education
had to establish efficiency standards that would "define the
types of programs, services, activities, and materials necessary
to achieve a thorough and efficient education," and then review
those standards biennially. 171 In addition, the commissioner is
required to review local levies that are higher than the maxi-
mum budgets of the previous year to determine whether the in-
creases are funding local educational elements that should be of-
fered statewide. 172 The resulting report gives funding level
recommendations, which are adjusted for inflation in the second
year to which the report applies. 173 The same section requires
the State Board of Education to review and update core curricu-
lum content standards every five years. 174 Under the New Jer-
sey Administrative Code, the Commissioner of Education must
convene an advisory panel of "public school educators, higher
education representatives, business representatives, and other
citizens" which will review the core standards and recommend
any updates. 175
The most significant criticism of the New Jersey Supreme
Court's treatment of school funding over the past twenty years 76
is that its focus on the extremes-the poorest and wealthiest
school districts-has resulted in funding inequity for schools
169. See 1996 N.J. Laws 138.
170. Id. § 4 (codified as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-4 (1996)).
171. Id. § 4(b).
172. Id.
173. Id. § 4(c).
174. Id. § 4(a). The New Jersey State Board of Education adopted the Core Curricu-
lum Content Standards in 1996 as a definition of the constitutional mandate to provide a
"thorough and efficient" education. See New Jersey Core Curriculum Content Standards:
Introduction, available at http://www.state.nj.us/njded/cccs
/intro.htm.
175. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6A, § 8-2.1(a)(4) (2004).
176. There have been eight Abbott decisions since 1985. Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376
(N.J. 1985) (Abbott I); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990) (Abbott II); Abbott v.
Burke, 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) (Abbott II1); Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997)
(Abbott IV); Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998) (Abbott V); Abbott v. Burke, 748
A.2d 82 (N.J. 2000) (Abbott VI); Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000) (Abbott VII);
Abbott v. Burke, 790 A.2d 842 (N.J. 2002) (Abbott VIII).
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that fall in the middle. 177 Since the court's orders have focused
on the so-called "Abbott districts,"178 the legislature has concen-
trated the bulk of its increased funding on those poorest urban
districts to bring them up to the level of funding in the wealthi-
est communities. 179 The remedy has been a success for the Ab-
bott districts, bringing their funding within a few hundred dol-
lars per student of the wealthiest districts in the state. 8 0
However, empirical data now indicates that poor districts out-
side the definition of an "Abbott district" and middle-wealth dis-
tricts are being adversely affected by the funding scheme and
have actually fallen behind the Abbott districts in funding lev-
els. 18 The lesson to be learned from the criticism of the New
Jersey litigation and legislative response is that in ordering a
funding remedy, the court should require comprehensive change
that addresses all school district needs. 8 2
B. Wyoming
The Wyoming Supreme Court also found obligations to pro-
vide both equality and quality under the Wyoming Constitution.
Wyoming's constitutional declaration of rights provides: "The
right of the citizens to opportunities for education should have
practical recognition. The legislature shall suitably encourage
means and agencies calculated to advance the sciences and lib-
eral arts."18 3 The Wyoming Constitution education article re-
quires the state to provide a "complete and uniform system of
public instruction,"18 4 and a "thorough and efficient system of
public schools, adequate to the proper instruction of all youth of
the state."85
In Washakie County School District No. 1 v. Herschler, the
Wyoming Supreme Court declared education a fundamental
177. See Gary W. Ritter & Sherri C. Lauver, School Finance Reform in New Jersey: A
Piecemeal Response to a Systemic Problem, 28 J. EDUC. FIN. 575 (Spring 2003).
178. See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 6A, § 10-1.2 (2004) (definition of "Abbott district" as the
twenty-eight districts identified by the supreme court in Abbott 11, 575 A.2d 359).
179. Ritter & Lauver, supra note 177, at 576.
180. Id. at 582 n.18.
181. Id. at 577.
182. Id. at 598 ("Funding inequities in New Jersey will persist until the state's law-
makers are willing to address this systemic problem with a remedy that is equally com-
prehensive.").
183. WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
184. WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 1.
185. Id. § 9.
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right under Wyoming Constitution article 1, section 23, and
struck down the school funding scheme on equal protection
grounds. 186 The court expressed its view that a funding scheme
should reflect differing district costs of providing a quality edu-
cation.187 It held that the legislature must design a system of
funding public schools that would reflect cost-differentials
among districts, and ultimately achieve "equality of quality." 88
After Washakie, the legislature did not accomplish that task. 89
Campbell County School District v. State arose in response
to the post-Washakie legislative inaction. 90 The court addressed
the Wyoming Constitution education article by looking at the
current meaning of each word and the meaning at the time of
ratification, forming a broad definition from the combined origi-
nal and contemporary meanings.' 91 It concluded, however, that
the ultimate definition of a "proper education" in Wyoming had
to come from the legislature. 92 The definition and resulting
funding scheme would only be constitutionally justified if sensi-
tive to "special needs and educational cost differentials." 93
Portions of the funding system that had been arbitrarily set
without considering "variances in individuals, groups and local
condition," 94 or the "actual cost of providing education for stu-
dents"' 95 were found unconstitutional. Funding components
that had originally been built on the doctrine of "economies of
scale" were likewise found unconstitutional because the legisla-
ture had only assumed larger schools benefited from economies
186. 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980).
187. See 907 P.2d 1238, 1246 (Wyo. 1995) (summarizing the Washakie decision).
188. See id.
189. See id. at 1247.
190. See generally 907 P.2d 1238.
191. Id. at 1259.
192. Id. The court stated:
the legislature, in fulfilling its constitutional duty, must define and specify
what a 'proper education' is for a Wyoming child." Id. It found the legislature's
framework for defining a "proper education" through performance and
accreditation standards was not adequate because they were based on
standards set up by local school districts, which according to the Court,
'potentially [created] forty-nine autonomous education systems.
Id. at 1262-1263.
193. Id. at 1269 ("The legislature is mandated to take into consideration various bal-
ancing factors and devise a state formula which will weight the calculation to compen-
sate for special needs and educational cost differentials.").
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1275 (discussing the distribution of funds through the classroom unit value,
which it noted was 'a legislatively determined figure").
372 Vol. 65
30
Montana Law Review, Vol. 65 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/5
EDUCATION IN MONTANA
of scale, but had never studied the actual cost of providing edu-
cation in different sized schools. 196 Optional district mill levies
were upheld as constitutional so long as the state had otherwise
implemented a "cost-based, state-financed proper education" in
all districts. 197 Noting that "the definition of a proper education
is not static and necessarily will change," the court observed
that local control of school districts could lead to innovative new
ideas that may change the definition of a proper education for
Wyoming students. 198 Accordingly, if a local school district en-
hanced its program with an innovation that "should be available
to all school districts as part of a proper education," the state
would have to provide the new component to all Wyoming stu-
dents.199
The court required the state to complete a "cost of education
study" to "inform the creation of a new funding system."20 0 It
stated: "To fulfill the constitutional command of 'equality of fi-
nancing will achieve equality of quality,' the legislature must
state and describe what a 'proper education' is for a Wyoming
child. The constitution requires it to be the best that we can
do." 201 The court provided broad guidelines of what that defini-
tion should include: (1) "small schools, small class size, low stu-
dent/teacher ratios, textbooks, low student/personal computer
ratios"; (2) uniform substantive curriculum; (3) sensitivity to
students' special educational needs; (4) "meaningful standards
for course content and knowledge attainment intended to
achieve the legislative goal of equipping all students for entry
to" higher education facilities or other purposes; and (5) "timely
and meaningful assessment" of all students.20 2
In 1996, the state performed the judicially-mandated cost of
education study using a "Resource Cost Model" approach. 20 3 In
196. Id. at 1277.
197. Id. at 1274.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1279.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Deborah A. Verstegen, Financing the New Adequacy: Towards New Models of
State Education Finance Systems that Support Standards Based Reform, 27 J. EDUC.
FIN. 749, 773 (Winter 2002). The Resource Cost Method "identifies specific instructional
components or resource 'ingredients' deemed necessary to provide state standards, goals
and objective, and then prices and sums these components." Id. at 772. Verstegen out-
lines other methods of studying educational costs and discusses their respective advan-
tages and disadvantages. Id.
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addition to meeting with local educators and educational poli-
cymakers-called the "professional judgment approach"-study
leaders conducted independent research to determine necessary
educational resources and the costs of providing those re-
sources.20 4  The Foundation Program in Wyoming is now ad-
justed for a variety of special educational factors. 20 5 Those fac-
tors include transportation, special education, "necessary small
schools,"206 routine maintenance, "responsibility, education and
experience level of administrators, the experience level of classi-
fied personnel and the seniority level of teachers in each dis-
trict," extra compensation paid to teachers, statutorily allowed
isolation and maintenance payments, small-sized districts, at-
risk students, vocational education students, the yearly effects of
inflation, and regional cost of living differences across the
state.20 7 The adjustment process and factors are reviewed at
least every five years "to determine if modifications are neces-
sary to ensure it remains cost-based in light of changing condi-
tions and modifications to law."20 8
V. MONTANA'S CURRENT SCHOOL FUNDING SYSTEM: INEQUALITY
AND INADEQUACY
Montana's current system of funding is essentially the same
as in 1993. It still allows school districts to rely on voted and
permissive tax levies to make up the difference between state
provisions and the district's costs. The current system perpetu-
ates inequalities between wealthy and poor school districts209-
disparities that become more pronounced as the state's level of
funding decreases. In addition, issues of overall funding ade-
204. Id. at 773-74. Verstegen noted that a professional judgment approach without
independent research raises conflict of interest issues. Id.
205. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-13-309 (2003).
206. See id. § 21-13-318.
207. See id. § 21-13-309. Each adjustment factor is specifically defined by statute.
208. Id. § 21-13-309(t).
209. Poorer school districts are those with lower assessed property valuations. See
VERN BRIMLEY, JR. & RULON R. GARFIELD, FINANCING EDUCATION IN A CLIMATE OF
CHANGE 69 (8th ed. 2002) ("Assessed value ranges from actual market value to a per-
centage of market value established by a taxing entity."). A fixed tax rate levied on as-
sessed value has the potential to produce vastly different outcomes in different districts
across Montana because property wealth is distributed differently throughout the state.
See id. (showing examples of the inequities that typically arise from this type of funding
system). Thus, a mill (.001 per dollar) levied on the assessed value of property in one
county has the potential to produce much more than a mill levied on the assessed value
of property in another.
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quacy are more apparent as time goes on.
School districts under the Foundation Program had the op-
tion of levying a set number of mills, rather than a set number
of dollars, to make up the difference between state funds and the
school's adopted budget.210 Funding inequities followed as the
Foundation funds dropped.211 Today, the same problems arise
when school districts rely on local mill levies to fully fund their
budgets. Under the current funding system, the state estab-
lishes a minimum and maximum range within which school dis-
tricts may budget.212 Budget levels are based on a per-pupil cal-
culation for each district, called the "Average Number
Belonging" (ANB), calculated from the enrollment count of the
previous year.213 The minimum baseline for a school district
budget is called the BASE Budget. 214 All schools must adopt a
budget that reaches at least the minimum BASE Budget level. 215
If a school adopts a budget over the minimum amount, the ex-
cess is funded through local tax levies.216 As such, the system
still allows for disparities between districts based on local
wealth.
Schools with declining enrollment are arbitrarily affected by
the current funding scheme. 217 When the level of state funding
210. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 7 Mont. Educ. Law 14, 41 (1st
Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 13, 1988) (called the "permissive levy").
211. See id.
212. OFFICE OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, FY 2003-04 GENERAL FUND BUDGET OVERVIEW
AND WORKSHEETS, POST-LEGISLATIVE VERSION 8, available at http://www.opi.state.mt.
us/PDF/SchoolFinanceforms/GeneralFundOverview04.pdf.
213. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-306 (2003). See also OFFICE OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION,
UNDERSTANDING MONTANA SCHOOL FINANCE AND SCHOOL DISTRICT BUDGETS 11 (March
2003), available at www.opi.state.mt.us/PDF
/SchoolFinance/budget/UnderstSchlFin.pdf.
214. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-307 (2003).
215. See OFFICE OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, supra note 213, at 15.
216. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-353 (2003). Trustees may adopt a school budget that
exceeds the BASE amount allowed to the district. Id. However, if they do they must
submit an increase in property taxes to the voters in the district for approval. Id. Any
budget increases approved are capped by the "maximum general fund budget for the dis-
trict." Id. § 20-9-353(1)(a). If trustees adopt a budget that exceeds this maximum, sec-
tion 20-9-308(3) requires a district to incrementally reduce its budget over the course of
five consecutive years to come within the maximum. Id. § 20-9-308(3). Under section
20-9-306, the maximum general fund budget is: (1) the basic entitlement for the district
+ (2) total per-student entitlement for the district + (3) special education grants. Id. §
20-9-306.
217. Linda McCulloch, Superintendent of Public Schools, in her State of Education
Speech on February 14, 2003, pointed out that Montana's current funding does not re-
flect the costs faced by individual schools:
School budgets are stretched to the breaking point. Montana's school enroll-
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decreases, schools must make budget cuts that are not necessar-
ily reflected by lower costs. 218 This inequality is due to a "natu-
ral accident"219-declining enrollment-and not justified by any
explicitly defined or educationally relevant factor. Montana's
per-pupil funding level does not come from an understanding of
the costs of providing educational resources to different sized
schools, but is rather based on previous expenditure levels and
the assumption that the doctrine of "economies of scale" function
in the Montana school system. 220 The Wyoming Supreme Court
struck down those portions of the Wyoming school funding sys-
tem that were based on the same assumption of economies of
scale with no supporting empirical data.221 Researchers subse-
quently studied four years of individual school enrollment and
expenditure data in Wyoming and were able to determine that,
with all other variables constant, for every ten percent increase
in individual school size, per-student costs decreased by two per-
cent.222 A Montana study of the effect of school size on education
costs should be based on the most recent research, some of
which indicates that economies of scale only function up to a cer-
tain point, after which substantially higher enrollment will re-
sult in "diseconomies of scale" and increased per-student
costs. 223 The results of such a study would inform a decision to
ment is declining because of a decline in birth rates. State support is then re-
duced due to our current funding formula .... While the number of kids goes
down, the school's operating budget does not drop in proportion. Many class-
room costs, like utilities and building maintenance are fixed and ongoing.
Superintendent Linda McCulloch, 2003 State of Education Speech (Feb. 14, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.opi.state.mt.us/Streamer/KeyNotespeechtext
.html.
218. See 2003 State of Education Speech, supra note 217.
219. See RAWLS, supra note 2, at 65.
220. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-306 (2003). The total per-ANB entitlement for high
school is $5,262 for the first ANB, decreased by 50 cents per ANB for each additional up
to 800 ANB, after which the per-ANB dollar amount stays the same. For elementary
schools, the total per-ANB entitlement is $3,949 for the first ANB, decreased by 20 cents
per ANB for each additional up to 1,000 ANB, after which each gets the same dollar
amount. For elementary schools with approved junior highs, the entitlement is $3,949
for kindergarten through 6th grade, decreased as described above, and $5,262 for grades
7-8, decreased in the same way as the high school entitlement.
221. See Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1277 (Wyo. 1995).
222. See Tyler J. Bowles & Ryan Bosworth, Scale Economies in Public Education: Evi-
dence from School Level Data, 28 J. EDUC. FIN. 285 (Fall 2002).
223. See Bruce Baker & William Duncombe, Balancing District Needs and Student
Needs: The Role of Economies of Scale Adjustments and Pupil Need Weights in School
Finance Formulas, 29 J. EDUC. FIN. 195, 197 (Winter 2004). Baker and Duncombe note:
"A few studies have identified that high schools above 1,000 students and elementary
schools above 600 students may inhibit student performance, and that these disecono-
mies of scale are particularly important for at-risk children." Id.
34
Montana Law Review, Vol. 65 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss2/5
EDUCATION IN MONTANA
weight the per-pupil funding levels for different sized schools.
Issues of quality become more pressing as time goes on. Al-
though there have been a few attempts to substantively define
the constitutional mandate of "quality" education in Montana,
no definition has ever been carried into law.224 Because Mon-
tana's constitutional mandate has never been defined, the actual
cost of providing quality educational opportunity to each student
in contemporary society has not been considered in calculating
the minimum and maximum allowable school district budgets
and per-pupil funding levels.225 As a result, Montana school
funding has never been placed on a constitutional foundation.
Annual inflation-related adjustments to basic entitlements and
per-student entitlements were included in the system in 2003.226
Certainly inflation adjustment to per-student funding is a nec-
essary measure to account for predictable increases in costs.
This measure, however, is based on the assumption that the
current funding levels are educationally justified and adequate,
and that inflation rates somehow track the rising cost of provid-
ing educational resources, an assumption unsupported by em-
pirical data. 227
As this article goes to press, Montana's funding system is
once again being litigated.228 In April 2004, District Judge Sher-
lock declared Montana's current state school funding system un-
constitutional in violation of article X, section 1 of the Montana
224. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text (discussing Board of Public Educa-
tion study of "basic quality education").
225. A new study calculating costs of a hypothetical system that the authors assert
reflects "quality" suggests that Montana's level of funding may not even rise to a mini-
mum level of adequacy. See generally John Myers & Justin Silverstein, Calculation of
the Cost of a Suitable Education in Montana in 2001-2002 Using the Professional Judg-
ment Approach (August 2002), available at http://www.mtsba.org/study/
Final%20Report.pdf.
226. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-326 (2003) (effective July 1, 2004) (basic entitlements
and per-ANB entitlements are adjusted yearly according to the consumer price index
(CPI)).
227. See National Center for Education Statistics, Measuring Inflation in Public
School Costs: Working Paper No. 97-43 (U.S. Dep't of Educ. 1997), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs97/9743.pdf. "It is important to recognize that while the CPI does
play a role in the determination of the salaries of school personnel, it still represents a
different set of goods and services than those purchased by school districts. The changes
in the CPI do not reflect all of the other factors that affect the supply of, and demand for,
individuals within the public education sector." Id. at 11.
228. Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, No. BDV-2002-528 (Mont.
1st Jud. Dist. Ct.).
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Constitution. 229 Evidence at trial indicated multiple areas of
funding inadequacy in Montana public schools, including prob-
lems with: (1) increasing numbers of schools at or above maxi-
mum budget levels; (2) meeting accreditation standards; (3) at-
tracting and retaining teachers; (4) large numbers of school
programs being cut; (5) constructing and maintaining safe and
adequate buildings; (6) competition for dollars between special
education and regular education; (7) declining state support for
the general fund; and finally, (8) "the fact that Montana's fund-
ing formula is not reasonably related to the costs of providing a
basic system of quality public elementary and secondary
schools," nor was it "based on a study of the funding necessary to
meet what the state and federal governments expect of Mon-
tana's schools."230 Additionally, Judge Sherlock found that the
current funding scheme violates article X, section 1(2) because
the State "has failed to recognize the distinct and unique cul-
tural heritage of American Indians and has shown no commit-
ment in its educational goals to the preservation of their cul-
tural identity."231 Sherlock also found the funding scheme
violates article X, section 1 as a whole because the state has
failed to adequately fund public schools and "is not paying its
share of the cost of the basic elementary and secondary school
system."232 Once again, the court found that accreditation stan-
dards did not fully define the constitutional rights and responsi-
bilities in Montana's education article.233 Sherlock ordered: "To
satisfy [the] Montana Constitution, the State's school finance
system must be based upon a determination of the needs and
costs of the public school system, and the school finance system
must be designed and based upon educationally-relevant fac-
tors."234 He stayed his decision "pending resolution of this mat-
ter before the Montana Supreme Court."235
To remedy the inequitable and inadequate funding system,
the Montana Supreme Court should first acknowledge the dual
state obligation under the Montana Constitution to provide both
a quality education and an equal opportunity to a quality educa-
229. Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, No. BDV-2002-528, 2004 ML
813 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. April 2004).
230. Id. I VIII(C)160 (Findings of Fact).
231. Id. 1 8 (Conclusions of Law and Order).
232. Id. 91 9-10 (Conclusions of Law and Order).
233. Id. 91 11 (Conclusions of Law and Order).
234. Id. 13 (Conclusions of Law and Order).
235. Id. $ 15 (Conclusions of Law and Order).
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tion. As a first step to fulfilling those obligations, the court
should require a legislative definition of the constitutional edu-
cation article that identifies those resources necessary to provide
a quality education to each student in Montana. 236 In doing so,
it may provide broad guidelines based on plain meaning and ju-
dicial and legislative precedent. 237 The Wyoming Supreme
Court synthesized the meaning of essential terms at the time of
ratification and the contemporary meaning of the same terms. 238
Using this approach, most of the terms in Montana's education
article have not changed in definition since 1972 when the con-
stitution was ratified.239 The definitions of Montana's constitu-
236. The legislature has recognized this need a number of times, but never enacted a
definition. See, e.g., supra Part III discussing various legislative attempts to define the
education article; see also S.B. 411, 2003 Leg., 58th Sess. (Mont. 2003) (the author's own
attempt to start a contemporary debate about the definition of Montana's education arti-
cle). Other authors have also noted that, unlike a number of other states, Montana has
never defined its constitutional education article. For example, Wayne Buchanan and
Deborah A. Verstegen in their article, School Finance Litigation in Montana, observed:
[Helena Elementary] clearly speaks to the fundamental question of a state gov-
ernment's role in the financing of its schools. Underlying it is the definition of
a quality basic education and the adequacy of the state finance scheme to sup-
port it equitably. Montana is in the process of discovering that this question
must be addressed before the responsibility of the state can be ascertained.
Wayne Buchanan & Deborah A. Verstegen, School Finance Litigation in Montana, 66
EDUC. LAW REP. 19, 31-32 (1991). Defining Montana's education article is a necessary
first step to meeting the constitutional mandate.
237. The New Jersey Supreme Court and the Wyoming Supreme Court both supplied
broad guidelines to the legislature in defining their constitutional education articles, but
both required the legislature to provide the ultimate definition. See Abbott, 575 A.2d at
367, 374, 390; Campbell County School District, 907 P.2d at 1259, 1279. The Montana
Supreme Court in Helena Elementary provided minimal guidance, but indicated that any
definition must exceed the accreditation standards in place at the time of that decision.
Helena Elementary, 236 Mont. at 54, 769 P.2d at 690.
238. Campbell County School District, 907 P.2d at 1259.
239. In 1972, Webster defined "quality" as "excellence; superiority." WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1161 (David B. Guralnik ed., World
Publ'g 2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S 1972]. It defined "opportunity" as "a combi-
nation of circumstances favorable for the purpose; fit time; a good chance or occasion, as
to advance oneself." Id. at 998. "Education" was defined as "the process of training and
developing the knowledge, skill, mind, character, etc., esp. by formal schooling, teaching,
training." Id. at 444. In 2002, Webster defined the adjective "quality" as "of or relating
to high society: aristocratic; of, relating to, or marked by good quality: excellent."
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 1859 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., Merriam-Webster 2002) [hereinafter
WEBSTER'S 20021. It defined "opportunity" as "a combination of circumstances, time, and
place suitable or favorable for a particular activity or action." Id. at 1583. "Education"
was defined as "the act or process of educating or of being educated: as . . .the act or
process of providing with knowledge, skill, competence, or usu. desirable qualities of be-
havior or character or of being so provided esp. by a formal course of study, instruction,
or training." Id. at 723.
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tional terms indicate the constitutional mandate that "equality
of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the
state," plainly means that each Montana citizen is guaranteed
an equally good chance to advance him or herself by acquiring
knowledge, skill, and competence through formal training.240
Coupled with article X, section 1(3), the legislature must provide
that formal training through public elementary and secondary
schools marked by good quality, excellence, and superiority. 241
Further substantive interpretation is clearly necessary, but this
plain meaning of terms could instruct the legislature in its
search for a definition. The legislature should also look to his-
torical foundations of Montana's public school system and in-
volve a diverse group of Montana citizens, educators, parents
and legislators in framing its definition. 242
The court should further specify that any definition and re-
sulting funding scheme should be subject to periodic legislative
review to reflect advancements in educational research.243 The
framers of the Montana Constitution implicitly recognized the
need for flexibility: "The word 'quality' is an instruction to the
legislature to provide not simply a minimum educational sys-
tem, but one which meets contemporary needs and produce[s] ca-
pable, well-informed citizens."244 To meet contemporary needs, a
legislative definition of the education article and the funding
scheme based on that definition must be periodically reviewed
and updated.
Funding should also be sensitive to special needs-the
unique needs of students, schools, and school districts. 245 The
current system appears to address differing costs between
smaller and larger schools and between elementary and high
240. See WEBSTER'S 1972, supra note 239; WEBSTER'S 2002, supra note 239.
241. See MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(3).
242. The most significant school funding revision in Montana's history-the 1949
Foundation Program-was the result of an informational program conducted by a
"'grassroots' committee of legislators, educators, parents, and other interested persons"
in 1947. See Merrill, supra note 43, at 4.
243. Both New Jersey and Wyoming provide for legislative review of their funding
schemes at least every five years. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-4 (2004); WYO.'STAT.
ANN. § 21-13-309(t) (2003).
244. IV CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 724 (emphasis added).
245. See BRIMLEY & GARFIELD, supra note 209, at 62 ("Equality of educational oppor-
tunity has been interpreted to mean providing the same amount of money for each pupil
who is to be educated. Gradually, however, financing formulas have recognized that it
costs more to educate some pupils than others.").
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schools.246 It also makes some provision for the exceptional costs
of providing special education. 247 However, there has been no
recent legislative study of the actual unit cost of providing edu-
cation in contemporary society.248 Likewise, there is no evidence
of the legislature studying the relationship between district
costs and educational opportunity. Research suggests that dis-
tricts struggling with high costs, such as urban areas with
higher teacher salaries, rural areas with higher transportation
costs, and districts with a higher concentration of special educa-
tional needs students will have to spend more dollars per stu-
dent to offer the same quality of educational opportunity that
other districts offer. 249 A district-by-district study of the cost of
providing different educational resources would more clearly de-
fine what "educationally relevant factors" should be considered
in setting and weighting funding amounts. 250 Once again, these
factors should be periodically reviewed to remain current and
keep up with educational innovation. The framers of Montana's
constitution anticipated such innovation, and thus made flexibil-
ity a fundamental priority in drafting the education article:
246. MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-9-306 (2003).
247. See Madalyn Quinlan, Montana, at 11-12, in National Center for Education Sta-
tistics, Public School Finance Programs of the U.S. and Canada: 1998-1999, available at
http://nces.ed.gov/edfinlpdf/StFinance/Montana.pdf. The fifty-state report is download-
able in .pdf format at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp
?pubid=2001309.
248. Brimley and Garfield observe in FINANCING EDUCATION IN A CLIMATE OF CHANGE
that as society changes, so do the costs of providing educational resources. See BRIMLEY
& GARFIELD, supra note 209, at 62-63. They note that the earliest examples of weighting
per-student funding was done to reflect different costs of smaller and larger sized school
districts, the conventional wisdom being that smaller rural school districts had higher
costs. Id. at 62. However, those costs have evolved in some states to reflect higher costs
in urban districts. Id. at 62-63. Whether this same shift has taken place in Montana,
where extreme effects of urbanization are not felt, could only be determined by studying
the unit cost of education in this state. Although there is no recent legislative study of
unit costs of education, one such study was prepared for plaintiffs in the current school
funding litigation in Montana. See generally Myers & Silverstein, supra note 225; see
also Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, No. BDV-2002-528, 2004 ML
813, IT 147-160 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Ct. April 2004) (discussing the professional judg-
ment study conducted by plaintiffs). The study used a combination of input and output
measures defined by Montana educators and experts to determine a per-pupil amount it
suggests would be "adequate" for different districts. Id.
249. See LUKEMEYER, supra note 10, at 14-15 (citing William Duncombe & John
Yinger, School Finance Reform: Aid Formulas and Equity Objectives: Metropolitan Stud-
ies Program Occasional Paper No. 175 (Syracuse Univ. Ctr. for Policy Research 1996);
Helen F. Ladd & John Yinger, The Case for Equalizing Aid, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 211 (1994)).
250. See Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 7 Mont. Educ. Law 14, 86 (1st
Jud. Dist. Ct. Jan. 13, 1988).
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"Fundamental to the committee's considerations were the twin
goals of protecting the integrity of a quality educational system
and allowing for flexibility to meet changes as yet unknown but
which will certainly occur in the future developments in the field
of learning.'251
Once the legislature identifies the resources essential to
provide quality education, it can fulfill the constitutional guar-
antee of equal educational opportunity by designing a system to
distribute those resources on an educationally relevant basis-
one which acknowledges unique student and district needs. Al-
though some inequality is inevitable, the Montana Constitution
mandates an even playing field when it comes to educational
opportunity. Inequality in the sense of how much certain com-
munities will value education, how much they will demand from
their children, how much they will demand from their teachers
and schools, is simply inescapable as a natural result of locale.
However, the Montana Constitution does not allow educational
opportunity to vary with locale-it requires equal educational
opportunity for every child.252 This requirement is essential to
minimizing the disparities between the affluent and poor in
Montana's communities. Deborah Verstegen, author of Financ-
ing the New Adequacy, notes: "All too frequently, inequalities
penalize poor children and youths, compounding adverse social
and economic circumstances by hobbling them in securing a vi-
able passport out of poverty-a quality education."253  John
Rawls observes that wealth is "necessary for the framing and
the execution of a rational plan of life."254 If wealth flows from
and is dependent on education, then by depriving children of an
equal opportunity to education, the state deprives them of an
equal opportunity to make life plans and pursue them.255 To
prevent this tragedy, the court should at least require essential
resources to be equalized in order to create the even quality
mandated by the Montana Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Montana's current funding scheme is based on the errone-
ous assumption that equal dollars per student or per district will
251. VI CONVENTION, supra note 8, at 1948 (statement of Delegate Champoux).
252. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1).
253. Verstegen, supra note 203, at 758.
254. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 433.
255. Id.
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produce equal resources, services, and curricula, and result in
the equal educational opportunity envisioned by the Montana
Constitution. But one size does not fit all in the public school
system. The Montana Constitution requires not only equal edu-
cational opportunity, but also quality educational opportunity.
The legislature needs to definitively address how quality
education should be measured in Montana, how the state can
provide students with an equal opportunity to receive a quality
education, and how the amount of funding put into educational
programs correlates to the level of quality as defined. The court
can and should offer guidance on these issues by clarifying the
relationship between equality and quality, and recognizing that
blind fiscal equality will not meet the state's constitutional obli-
gations. A judicial remedy should specifically require the state
to first define the education article by studying the resources
necessary to provide a quality education to all students in Mon-
tana, then study the costs of providing those resources and de-
sign a funding scheme that reflects its findings. The final fund-
ing system should be sensitive to students', schools' and school
districts' unique needs.
The Montana public school system must be reformed to re-
flect the essential theory of justice upon which it was founded-
it must fulfill the guarantee of equal educational opportunity.
Should the issue be presented to the Montana Supreme Court
again, the underlying philosophy of equal opportunity should in-
form the court's decision. The guarantee of equal educational
opportunity envisions a system that is sensitive to individual
student and school needs and funds accordingly. Instead of de-
creasing overall quality in the name of equality, the system
should increase the overall level of quality. By recognizing these
foundational principles, and clarifying the dual obligations to
provide quality and equality under the Montana Constitution
education article, the court can help breathe life into Montana
citizens' constitutional right to equal educational opportunity.
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